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W

hy do wars last as long as they do? Why do some rage for years, while others
last only a few months or days? The question matters because longer wars
have serious consequences. They produce more fatalities1 and are a greater threat to
regimes’ stability than are shorter wars.2 To cite but one prominent example, had
World War I ended in 1916, rather than dragging on into 1918, the German, AustroHungarian, and Russian Empires would probably have survived, and the rise of both
communism and fascism would have been less likely. Thus, war duration can have
important implications that go beyond the immediate war in question.
Older research reasonably argued that less intense war ﬁghting strategies and
rough terrain extend conﬂicts.3 Yet variation in war duration can be found even

1. H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World
War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Zachary C. Shirkey, “When and How
Many: The Effects of Third Party Joining on Casualties and Duration in Interstate Wars,” Journal
of Peace Research 49 (2012): 321–34; Alex Weisiger, Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and
Unlimited Conﬂicts (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013).
2. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Gary Woller, “War and the Fate of
Regimes: A Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 86 (1992): 638–46.
3. D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985,” American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 239–57. The relationship between the balance of forces and
war duration is less clear. This is because imbalance, which would seemingly shorten wars, can
cause the weaker side to pursue guerrilla strategies, thereby extending conﬂicts. Also, while the relative balance of forces should affect the terms of any settlement, rationalists suggest it is disagreement about that balance rather than the balance itself that inﬂuences war duration. See James D.
Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49 (1995): 379–414;
Donald Wittman, “How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution
23 (1979): 743–63. Thus, it is difﬁcult to draw any conclusions about the relationship between the
military balance and the likely duration of a war. Last, there is no consensus about whether military
technology that favors offense should lead to longer or shorter wars, or even if it is possible to dePublished online March 5, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/696287
Polity, volume 50, number 2 (April 2018), pp. 162–167. 0032-3497/2018/5002-0002$10.00.
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among wars of similar intensity and terrain.4 More recent research has turned to
looking at how states bargain with each other. What allows and prevents states from
reaching mutually acceptable bargains to halt the ﬁghting? Do obstacles to peace
stem from parochial interests of leaders, psychological hurdles that prevent leaders
from recognizing or accepting defeat, entrapment dynamics of leaders beholden to
hawkish supporters, or the nature of the conﬂict itself? Such research has produced
answers stemming from the rationalist bargaining framework, domestic politics,
and psychology.
Rationalist approaches have looked to the causes of war to explain their duration.
With some exceptions, rationalists have argued that longer wars are likely to have
been caused by commitment problems, which arise when expected future shifts in
relative power make it impossible for states to credibily commit to agreements today,
since they would have strong incentives to renege and either violate or renegotiate the
agreement in the future.5 Rationalists believe that commitment problems are the better explanation of long wars because private information about states’ current capabilities and resolve is revealed reasonably quickly by battles and exchanges of offers
for settlement, often allowing states to reach a mutually acceptable settlement.6
Commitment problems, on the other hand, may take years to resolve because of
the need to signiﬁcantly degrade an opponent’s power in order to prevent or offset
potential future power shifts or even bring about regime change in an opponent.
Domestic politics approaches have suggested that leaders may prolong wars due
to high personal stakes in or private beneﬁts from the war7 or due to an inability to
termine whether technology favors offense. See Karen R. Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” International Security 28 (2003–
04): 45–83; Stephen Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” Journal
of Politics 63 (2001): 741–74; Marco Nilsson, “Offense-Defense Balance, War Duration, and the
Security Dilemma,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 56 (2012): 467–89; Branislav Slantchev, “How
Initiators End their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,” American Journal
of Political Science 48 (2004): 813–29.
4. Weisiger, Logics of War, 1–2 (see note 1 above).
5. Commitment problems arise when anticipated future power shifts create an incentive for
a party to an agreement to renege on that agreement when it has become more powerful. Commitment problems can also arise if a given regime is seen as being dispositionally unable to honor
an agreement. These dynamics undermine states’ ability to reach agreements today as there is
little reason to expect the agreement to hold in the future. See Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 (2006): 169–203.
6. Robert Powell, “Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power,” American Journal of Political
Science 56 (2012): 620–37; Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2009); Weisiger, Logics of War (see note 1 above).
7. Sarah Croco, “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic
Punishment,” American Political Science Review 105 (2011): 457–77; Goemans, War and Pun-
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construct a domestic governing coalition that could both accept a peace settlement
and remain in power.8 These studies vary in the relative importance they assign to
individual leaders versus the political regime as a whole, suggesting avenues for further research.
Psychological approaches argue that it is ultimately difﬁcult to view extremely
protracted and costly wars as the consequence of a rational decision-making process. Scholars focusing on psychology have argued that cognitive biases, a focus on
sunk costs, or concerns about national honor may prevent settlement.9 They have
also found that emotions affect beliefs and decision making, which in turn can inﬂuence how states update their expectations for war and their willingness to accept
a proposed settlement.10
While each of these approaches has been productive, the disagreements across
and also within them are worth more attention. The aim of this symposium is to
create a dialogue between scholars from these varying approaches. The hope is that
such a conversation will not only help to clarify disagreements and to determine
which factors are most important, but also to ﬁnd areas of agreement and perhaps
of synergy.
Indeed, recent years have seen some attempts to ﬁnd a productive synthesis between rationalist and psychological approaches. For example, Streich and Levy examine how motivated and unmotivated biases inﬂuence the role of information
asymmetries in causing war.11 In particular, they demonstrate that Russian racial
biases and a focus on the most optimistic intelligence reports, combined with signiﬁcant uncertainty about the relative capabilities of Russia and Japan, led Moscow
to already favor war in 1904—even though waiting would have been rational, since
Russian military strength in the Far East would continue to grow as construction
ishment (see note 1 above); Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 48 (2004): 937–61; Elizabeth A. Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War (Palo Alto,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).
8. Stanley, Paths to Peace (see previous note).
9. Thomas M. Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible: Honor, Bargaining, and War,” Security
Studies 24 (2015): 528–62; Dominic Johnson, Overconﬁdence and War: The Havoc and Glory of
Positive Illusions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Alexander Lanoszka and
Michael A. Hunzeker, “Rage of Honor: Entente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in
the First World War,” Security Studies 24 (2015): 662–95; Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 7
above).
10. Thomas M. Dolan, “Go Big or Go Home? Positive Emotions and Responses to Wartime
Success,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 230–42.
11. Philip Streich and Jack S. Levy, “Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904–1905,” Foreign Policy Analysis 12 (2016): 489–511.
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of the Trans-Siberian Railway continued over the next decade. Likewise, Lake
shows that while the rationalist framework is helpful for understanding interactions between the United States and Iraq leading up to their 2003 war, the role that
information asymmetries and commitment problems played in causing the war
cannot be fully understood without factoring in American and Iraqi biases,
misperceptions, and domestic politics.12 Finally, a recent special issue of International Organization focuses on the implications of the behavioral revolution for
understanding international relations and whether new psychological insights
about how actors assess risks, make inter-temporal tradeoffs, and update beliefs
could be productively combined with rationalist approaches. In particular, it appears
that these new insights, including the possibility of social preferences and the connections between intuitions, emotions, and reasoning, might help us to understand actors’ beliefs, preferences, resolve, and preferred strategies.13 While the jury is still
out on whether such a fusion between rationalist and psychological approaches can
be successfully forged, it is clear that the disagreements and possible syntheses between rational and psychological approaches comprise an important and fertile area
of research worthy of further exploration.
With this goal in mind, the contributors to this symposium represent a variety
of approaches to explaining, and arguments about, war duration. First, Dan Reiter
argues that it is vital to think of war onset and war duration as one process, since the
overlap between the two phenomena is evident in extant research. Speciﬁcally, theories of war duration often build directly upon theories of war initiation. He argues
that this overlap can be leveraged to allow for better testing of theories and improved theory construction.14
Second, Elizabeth Stanley builds on recent research in neuroscience, psychology,
and stress physiology to develop the micro-foundations of decision making under stress. She then connects these insights to bargaining, domestic politics, and

12. David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations
of the Iraq War,” International Security 35 (Winter 2010–11): 7–52.
13. See especially: Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations,” International Organization 71 (2017): S1–S31; Brian C. Rathbun, Joshua D.
Kertzer, and Mark Paradis, “Homo Diplomaticus: Mixed-Method Evidence of Variation in Strategic Rationality,” International Organization 71 (2017): S33–S60; Joshua D. Kertzer, “Resolve, Time,
and Risk,” International Organization 71 (2017): S109–S136; Janice Gross Stein, “The MicroFoundations of International Relations Theory: Psychology and Behavioral Economics,” International Organization 71 (2017): S249–S263; Robert Powell, “Research Bets and Behavioral IR,” International Organization 71 (2017): S265–S277.
14. Dan Reiter, “Unifying the Study of the Causes and Duration of Wars,” Polity 50 (2018):
168–77.
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psychological theories of war duration so as to better ground these frameworks in
human behavior and analyze their contributions to the literature. In particular, she
argues that the decline of leaders’ cognitive capacity, tolerance of ambiguity, and
ability to incorporate new information due to prolonged stress can help explain
why when wars last longer, it becomes more diffﬁcult to end them.15
Third, Thomas Dolan notes that by focusing on perceptual biases and the cognitive obstacles to learning and decision making, psychological theories of war have
been limited to explaining long wars, though they can also help to explain short
wars. Dolan contends that psychological theories that address emotions, individual
traits, and decision making can and should be able to explain when leaders’ risk
acceptance, belief structures, and responsiveness to events make short wars more
likely. He concludes that creating psychological explanations of short wars will
make psychological approaches more complete and better position them to compete with rationalist explanations of war.16
Fourth, Alex Weisiger argues that rationalist explanations of long wars are more
compelling than psychological explanations, since the latter often are empirically
intractable, cannot explain short wars, or largely mirror the predictions of rationalist explanations. He argues that as long as rationalist arguments can be seen as reasonable approximations of reality, their simplicity will make them more appealing
as explanations of war duration than psychological interpretations are.17
In the next article of the symposium, I argue that testing competing theories of
long wars is extremely difﬁcult. To some extent, this is a result of deﬁnitional and
scope issues that are inherent in the study of war duration. More problematic, however, is that many theories of war duration predict similar behaviors and that both
leadership groups and individual leaders often have multiple reasons for favoring
continued ﬁghting. This combination of overlapping predicitons and multicausality makes testing theories of war duration very difﬁcult.18
Weisiger concludes the symposium by highlighting points of agreement and disagreement between the various contributors and identifying open questions. He focuses especially on the connections between war initiation and decisions to continue

15. Elizabeth A. Stanley, “War Duration and the Micro-Dynamics of Decision Making under Stress,” Polity 50 (2018): 178–200.
16. Thomas M. Dolan, “Moving Beyond Pathology: Why Psychologists Should Care About
Short Wars,” Polity 50 (2018): 210–14.
17. Alex Weisiger, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate War
Duration,” Polity 50 (20180): 215–24.
18. Zachary C. Shirkey, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate
War Duration,” Polity 50 (2018): 225–37.

This content downloaded from 146.096.128.036 on August 24, 2018 06:35:44 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Zachary C. Shirkey | 167
ﬁghting, the causes of short wars, and the need to adjudicate between competing explanations of war duration.19
Given the continued occurrence of wars, both long and short, understanding
what causes them to vary in duration remains relevant. I hope that this symposium will not only help to clarify points of agreement and disagreement between
various explanations of war duration, but will also spur further and improved research that may help those grappling with removing obstacles to war termination
and settlement.

Zachary C. Shirkey is Associate Professor of Political Science at Hunter College,
City University of New York. His research focuses on military intervention, alignment choices, and war duration. He has published in the Journal of Peace Research,
International Studies Review, Civil Wars, PS: Political Science & Politics, and the
Journal of Theoretical Politics. Shirkey has also authored three books: Is This a Private Fight or Can Anybody Join? (Ashgate, 2009), Joining the Fray (Ashgate, 2012),
and (with Ivan Savic) Uncertainty, Threat, and International Security (Routledge,
2017). He can be reached at zshirkey@hunter.cuny.edu.

19. Alex Weisiger, “Conclusion,” Polity 50 (2018): 238–42.

This content downloaded from 146.096.128.036 on August 24, 2018 06:35:44 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

